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Abstract
We model the optimal regulation of continuous, irreversible, capacity expansion, in a model in which the
regulated network rm has private information about its capacity costs, investments need to be nanced out
of the rm's cash ows from selling network access and demand is stochastic. If asymmetric information
is large, the optimal mechanism consists of a regulatory holiday for low-cost rms, and a mark-up regime
for higher-cost rms. With the regulatory holiday, a rm receives the full revenue of capacity sales, and
expands capacity as if it were an unregulated monopolist. Under the mark-up regime, a rm receives only a
fraction of the capacity revenues, and is obliged to expand capacity whenever the price for capacity reaches
a threshold. The regulatory holiday is necessary to fund information rents to the most ecient rms, which
invest relatively early, as direct investment subsidies are not feasible.
Keywords: regulatory holiday, real option value, asymmetric information, optimal contracts
JEL classication:D81, D82, L51
1 Introduction
Since the nineties many regulated network industries switched from cost-plus (or rate-of-return) to incentive
regulation, often under some form of price cap regulation. This switch was motivated by the fear that cost-
plus regulated rms would gold-plate their networks and over-invest in capital (Averch and Johnson, 1962)
and the realization that a price cap provides high-powered incentives for cost-eciency (Cabral and Riordan,
1989).1 However, in recent years stakeholders have argued that with high powered incentive regulation, rms
postpone socially ecient investments in durable assets, especially in risky environments, and that a dierent
form of regulation is necessary. For instance, in response to large investment needs, the UK electricity and
gas regulator OFGEM modernized its price cap mechanism by explicitly taking into account these investment
needs.2 European energy directives allow specic network investments to be exempted from regulation in order
to foster investments if uncertainty is large in a regime which is often called a regulatory holiday.3 For the
∗We have beneted from useful comments from seminar participants at Ecoles de mines de Paris, Groningen University, Tilburg
University, Toulouse University, the Symposium in Honour of Jean Tirole in The Hague, the IFN Stockholm Conference on The
Performance of Electricity Markets, and from discussions with Peter Broer, Bruno Julien, Thomas-Olivier Léautier and Thomas
Tangerås.
†Dept. of Economics & Tilec, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, e-mail:
bwillems@tilburguniversity.edu
‡Dept. of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, University of Groningen, PO Box 72, 9700 AB Groningen, The Netherlands
and Tilec extra-mural fellow. e-mail: g.t.j.zwart@rug.nl
1See for instance Sappington (2002) for an overview of the perceived drawbacks of rate of return regulation.
2Based on the work of Littlechild, the UK was one of the rst countries to introduce the RPI-X price cap model (Beesley and
Littlechild, 1989). In 2010, after a revision of the existing pricing regulation (the RPI-X@20 review), a new set of regulatory
principles was introduced with the RIIO-model (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Output), which is still a form of price
regulation (where prices are set for a period of 8 years) but which also includes output obligations for the rms, and additional
funds for experimentation (OFGEM, 2010b).
3European regulation for both electricity and gas market (Regulation (EC) No.714/2009, Article 17 & Directive 2009/73/EC,
Article 36) allow granting a regulatory holiday (exemptions) for new infrastructure investments under strict conditions. One
of those conditions is that the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment would not take place unless
an exemption was granted. The European Commission (2015) received 35 requests regarding exemption, most of which were
(partially) granted.
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telecom sector, ETNO, the industry association representing European telecom operators, recommends relaxing
access regulation, as it sees it as the main reason for European infrastructure investments lagging those in the
U.S. (Williamson, Lewin and Wood, 2016).4 Also academic scholars recognize that implementing price cap
regulation is challenging for durable investments and when uncertainty is important (Guthrie, 2006; Armstrong
and Sappington, 2007).
In this paper we contribute to this debate by studying the optimal regulation of capacity investments in a
dynamic setting in which investment prospects are uncertain. For this we consider a regulated private rm that
has to gradually expand its network to cope with a growth in demand for network access, needs to fund its
investments from operating prots and has superior information on investments costs. The regulator contracts
with the rm about when it should expand capacity (and when it would be better to delay), at which price the
capacity should be sold, and which fraction of its revenues it may keep. The regulator acts as a social planner
and maximizes the expected discounted sum of consumers' surplus and the rm's prot.
In the optimal regulatory mechanism existing capacity is always used eciently: prices for network access
are equal to the short run marginal cost of transportation as long as there is spare capacity, and prices are
above marginal cost, when there is congestion. Capacity is expanded, whenever the price for capacity reaches a
threshold value. This price threshold increases with investment costs, and is always higher than under the rst
best symmetric information optimum with demand uncertainty. Hence, investments are delayed.5
As we assume that the rm does not receive subsidies, investment costs need to be paid from market revenues.
However, any operating prots that remain after those costs have been paid for, could be taxed by the regulator.
Under optimal regulation the regulator does not tax the rms which reveal to be relatively ecient, while the
tax rate for the less ecient rms increases with their levels of ineciency. Those low tax rates are necessary
to provide the ecient rms with information rents.
If the information asymmetry between the regulator and the rm is large, then the relatively ecient rms
will be allowed to invest as if they were unregulated monopolists, as this provides the largest possible information
rents. Hence, a regulatory holiday is optimal for those rms. If the information asymmetry is small, then the
regulator will bunch the more ecient rms and require identical investment levels for these. Hence, optimal
regulation no longer results in an equilibrium with full separation of types.
In our model demand growth is not fully predictable (i.e. stochastic) and network investments are sunk.
Hence the rm is continuously forecasting demand and balancing the benets of expanding capacity now (and
obtaining additional revenue) and delaying investments (and obtaining superior information about future de-
mand). In other words, it needs to take into account the real option value of investments (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). McDonald and Siegel (1986) show that an unregulated monopolist delays investments under uncertainty,
and Pindyck (1988) extends this result to a continuous investment model. While also rst-best investment
involves a delay, under monopoly, this delay is longer. If a regulator would try to correct this situation with
only the price cap instrument at its disposal, then the rst best outcome cannot be reached (Dobbs, 2004), as
one instrument is used for two goals: ecient investments ex-ante and optimal consumption ex-post. Building
on Dobbs, but introducing scale economics for capacity expansion  in which case grouping investments across
time is cost ecient  Evans and Guthrie (2012) show that the price cap should be lowered and that it might
be ecient to allow some demand rationing to increase the size of subsequent expansions. Roques and Savva
(2009) extend Dobbs' model to a Cournot duopoly with a price cap. Our paper also starts from Dobbs' model
but includes asymmetric information, a self-nancing constraint and assumes that the regulator has additional
4The European Commission recognizes the challenges of building the Next Generation Access Networks (NGA), but, in contrast
to the energy sector, does not allow regulatory holidays for the telecommunication sector (speech Kroes, 2012). Moreover, the
European Commission has successfully appealed the decision of the German government to grant Deutsche Telekom a regulatory
holiday for upgrading internet services to the VDSL standard. (Commission v. Germany 2009, case number C-424/07, the European
Court of Justice.) Nevertheless, some leaked documents suggest that the German government is still considering softening the
regulation on the incumbent to foster additional investments (Stupp, 2016).
5Note that the rst best investment expansion plan already delays investments to take into account the real option value of
network expansion.
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instruments to enforce investments. As we assume constant returns to scale in capacity expansion, it is never
optimal to group investments or to ration demand, in contrast to Evans and Guthrie (2012).
In order to model the interaction between the regulator and the rm, we rely on the assumption that the rm
has superior information about its own investment costs as in the seminal paper by Baron and Myerson (1982).
While most of those types of models allow for for lump-sum transfers to the rm, we impose a self-nancing
constraint. In Baron and Myerson, the most ecient rm invests at the ecient level, i.e. there is no distortion
at the top, and gains information rents by receiving a large lump-sum transfer. In our model, information rents
can only be obtained by being more protable in the market, and hence investment levels need to be distorted
away from the ecient level. In fact, we nd that if the information asymmetries are large, monopoly level
investments are optimal for the most ecient rms. So we nd what could be called maximal distortion at the
top. If information asymmetries are small, we nd a bunching equilibrium for the most ecient rms. Our
results are similar to Gautier and Mitra (2006). They assume that the regulator can provide lump-sum transfers
but is limited by its budget constraint, which is determined exogenously. They nd bunching for ecient types
and separation for less ecient types. In our model, the transfers that the rm can receive are determined
endogenously by its investment decisions and the revenues those investments generate. Moreover, we nd a
separating equilibrium if information asymmetry is large.
One strand of the literature on incentive regulation and durable investments highlights the lack of com-
mitment by the regulator.6 If a regulator cannot commit to a price level for a suciently long period, it will
lower prices once investment has taken place as those prices are ex-post ecient. This will lead to hold-up
and lower investments ex-ante. In order to address this commitment problem Gans and King (2004) propose
a regulatory holiday in which the regulator commits not to regulate prices for a limited duration, under the
implicit assumption that it is easier to commit not to regulate than to commit to a high regulated price. We
nd that even if the regulator has full commitment power, it might be optimal to provide a regulatory holiday
to the most ecient rms, as this provides information rents for rms who want to invest earlier and with larger
quantities. Note that the regulatory holiday in our model is not unconditional. If a rm with a regulatory
holiday invests too late, then a fraction of its operating prots should be taxed.
Many network industries are characterized by features similar to the ones of our model. They have capital
intensive networks with relatively long-lived assets. Examples include the local-loop in telecommunications
markets, low voltage distribution and high voltage transmission networks in power markets. Growing demand
by network users both in volume and service quality require continuous upgrades and expansions of switches
in local central oces, voltage transformers and new communication equipment in power networks.7 Recent
technological changes have put those investments requirements to the forefront. Video on demand and cloud
computing creates additional pressure on telecommunication networks, the large scale introduction of renewable
energy and decentralized production requires substantial upgrade of power networks. Many network rms have
been privatized and governments are not keen on subsidizing investments.
The characterization of the telecom sector by the European association of telecom operators highlights many
of our assumptions:
The bulk of the investment required to meet policy objectives for the Digital Single Market will
need to come from private investment in Europe's access networks. This private investment is a
continuous and incremental, rather than a one-o, process. Investment decisions are constrained
6Another strand of literature discusses the practical challenges for implementing price cap regulation when long term investments
are necessary. Joskow (2008) reports problems with the correct measurement of the cost of capital in the energy sector and the
diculties for setting new prices at the end of a regulatory period. Evans and Guthrie (2005) extend Ramsey pricing to a dynamic
setting and shows that the incentive regulation is not feasible if the regulator takes the value the investments at their replacement
value.
7Instead of a growth of demand volume, a dierent interpretation of our model would be that demand for quality increases over
time. Equivalently, instead of demand growth and innitely lived assets, we could assume constant demand and network capacity
which degrades over time and where the rm builds replacement capacity when necessary. Mathematically this model would be
very similar.
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by the annual cash ows generated by the businesses.... Market players are better placed to make
ecient investment decisions than NRAs [National Regulatory Authorities] or governments. They
have far more information on both the incremental costs of deploying new technologies and the
incremental revenues which might ow from investing (Williamson, Lewin and Wood 2016, Pg.2-3).
In our model we assume that the regulator not only regulates the rm's revenue (by setting which fraction
of operating prot the rm is allowed to keep), but also enforces the required investments levels. Such dual
requirements are also found in practice. For instance under the new RIIO regulatory model for the UK energy
markets, the regulator not only species a certain price level, but also agrees on specic output parameters. If
rms are unable to reach those output targets they will loose their operating license (OFGEM, 2010a).
In our paper we do not consider one-o (lumpy) investments. Moreover, we consider information asymmetry
on a static parameter (costs) and assume that the information asymmetry is not related to the stochastic demand
realization, although those features might sometimes be present in practice. We refer to two companion papers
for those aspects of regulation: Broer and Zwart (2013) assume that investments are lumpy and only occur
once; Arve and Zwart (2014) assume asymmetric information with respect to stochastic parameters instead of
static ones, and allow for lump sum transfers to the rm.
In telecommunication markets, access providers are often vertically integrated and compete with the buyers
of network access in a downstream retail market. Those access providers might also decide to by-pass the
existing access provider, by investing in a competing network. The regulator needs to take those aspects into
account when designing access regulation. We neglect those additional considerations in our paper. Cambini
and Jiang (2009) provide an excellent survey of this extended eld of study.8
2 Model
We consider a continuous-time, continuous investment model of a principal, the regulator, contracting with
a monopolist to make irreversible investments dQ(t) to expand network capacity Q(t), as in Dobbs (2004).
Capacity is a continuous variable, and capacity expansions come at a constant marginal cost c. There is no
depreciation of capacity.9 Initial capacity at t = 0, the time of contracting, is Q(0) = 0, i.e. we consider a
greeneld project.10 Marginal cost c is drawn from a cumulative distribution F (c) with full support [cL, cH ],
and density f(c) > 0. A sucient condition that the solution of the rst-order conditions actually corresponds
to a maximum, is that the density is downward sloping f ′(c) ≤ 0 on its support [cL, cH ]. We will assume this.11
At each moment in time, the capacity Q(t) is sold to users at a price p(t) (we will drop the t-dependence of
price and other variables in subsequent notation).
The demand for network capacity has constant elasticity,
p = AQ−γ (1)
where 0 < γ < 1 is the inverse of demand elasticity. The associated ow of gross consumer surplus from using
Q is then AQ−γ/(1− γ).
The demand shift parameter A is stochastic, and satises a geometrical Brownian motion,
dA = µAdt+ σAdz, (2)
8The policy discussion is further complicated by the Ladder of Investments idea. Setting low access prices initially might
attract entrants, who are then incentivized in a later stages by a higher access price to build their own networks.
9It would be a straightforward extension of the model to assume a constant depreciation rate.
10Alternatively, we demand that the regulator also needs to remunerate the monopolist for its existing investments in ecient
capacity.
11 Below we will show that our condition will only be relevant for costs above a certain (endogenously determined) threshold
level. If local rst order conditions are not sucient, then the optimal contract will need additional ironing as in Guesnerie and
Laont (1984).
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where µ and σ > 0 are the associated drift and volatility parameters. As A grows over time, demand for capacity
will increase, making capacity investment more valuable. We will assume that demand A and capacity Q are
observable and veriable by the regulator, but the realization of investment cost c is private information.
The principal's objective is to maximize expected total welfare which is the dierence of gross consumers'
surplus and investment costs. The ow of total welfare, given costs c, equals




where dQ(t) ≥ 0 is the irreversible investment made at time t. The continuation value of total expected welfare
at time t and capacity Q equals the expected discounted sum of these ows,










where E denotes the expectation over A(t), and r the risk-free rate. We assume r > µ.
The regulator contracts with the monopolist to achieve optimal investment. A contract species an invest-
ment rule, that depends on the observable parameters A (demand size) and Q (installed capacity), as well as
a monetary transfer to the agent that remunerates him. We assume the following budget constraint: total







In addition, we impose the participation constraint on the monopolist that total expected prots should be
non-negative at the time of writing the contract, for any cost c:






3 First-best and monopoly benchmarks
As a benchmark, we rst explore the rst-best outcome (as analysed in Pindyck, 1988). In the absence of
asymmetric information, the principal will design an investment policy that species capacity additions as a
function of the state variables A, the current value of the demand shift parameter, and Q, the current installed
capacity: capacity will be expanded as soon as demand reaches some threshold value. We denote by Ā(Q) the
threshold value for A, given Q, at which investment occurs.12
With c known, the principal sets the threshold Ā(Q) to optimize total continuation welfare
W (A,Q, t) = E
[ˆ ∞
t
e−r(τ−t)U(A,Q, τ, c) dτ
]
.
The standard method of solving for W is rst to note that in the region A < Ā(Q) where no investment occurs,












Imposing the boundary condition thatW vanishes when A→ 0, the general solution to this dierential equation
12Note that since there is no exogenous dependence on time other than through A, the optimal policy, as well as total welfare,
cannot explicitly depend on time t.





(1− γ)(r − µ)
+ g(Q)Aλ, (7)
where g(Q) is any function of Q and λ is the positive solution to the fundamental quadratic r = µλ+ 12σ
2λ(λ−1).
In this expression, the rst term represents the expected present value from using existing capacity Q (without
any future expansions), while the second term is the value of the option to expand capacity beyond its current
level if demand rises.
Next, we solve for g(Q) by imposing the boundary condition at the point of investment Ā(Q), that the
marginal benet of increasing Q should equal the marginal cost of investment,
∂W
∂Q
(Ā(Q), Q) = c.






















which species, jointly with equation (7), total welfare W , given an investment threshold Ā(Q). Note that
welfare W is and increasing function of g(Q). The optimal investment threshold then follows from point-wise




(r − µ)c ≡ p̄c, (9)
or in other words, investing whenever price p reaches the level p̄c. At t = 0, when capacity Q = 0, there will be
a one-o investment Q0 = (
A0
p̄c )
1/γ to bring initial price to the threshold price.
The price at which optimal investment occurs exceeds the annualized costs by the factor λ/(λ − 1) > 1,
which itself depends on the parameters of the stochastic process and in particular grows as volatility σ increases.
This is a reection of the well-known option value of delaying investment (McDonald and Siegel, 1986).
As a second benchmark, it will be relevant to consider the investment rule that an unregulated monopolist
receiving all revenues from selling capacity would choose. Dene the rm's prot ow as
π(A,Q) dt = pQdt− cdQ = AQ1−γ dt− cdQ, (10)
and the associated total expected continuation value of the rm as






The unregulated monopolist will then choose an investment threshold Ā(Q) that maximizes that expected value.














analogously to expressions (7, 8) for total welfare. We can again use point-wise maximization to nd the prot
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This expression diers from the welfare optimizing price p̄c by the 1−γ factor, representing the standard Lerner
markup, (p̄m − p̄c)/p̄m = γ.
Finally, it is useful to evaluate total rm value V (A,Q) under the rst-best investment rule, i.e. invest
whenever price reaches p̄c. Substituting the corresponding threshold Ā(Q) in the rm's value function (12), we
nd that the rm just breaks even, including the costs of the initial investment to bring capacity from Q = 0 to
a level consistent with the threshold price. In other words, with symmetric information on costs, the regulator
can ask the rm to invest according to the rst-best rule, and remunerate it using the proceeds of the capacity
sales, hence satisfying both the budget constraint (5) and the rm's participation constraint (6). We summarize
these benchmark results as
Lemma 1. Compared to a welfare optimizing social planner, a monopolist delays investment in capacity. That










(r − µ)c. (14)
for the monopolist and the social planner respectively. When a greeneld rm invests at the competitive threshold
p̄c, total expected revenues from selling capacity at market clearing prices equal total costs,
V (p̄c, Q(p̄c); p̄c)− cQ(p̄c) = 0. (15)
4 Optimal regulation under adverse selection
In this section we turn our attention to regulation with asymmetric information on the rm's capacity expansion
cost c. We consider the regulator oering the rm a (menu of) contracts for a capacity expansion schedule that
may depend on demand (or price) realizations, which are observable and contractable. In return, the regulator
oers a transfer fee T to the rm. The fee has to be nanced out of the expected revenues of the capacity sale
and therefore has to satisfy budget constraint (5). And the rm should earn a non-negative prot, as reected
by participation constraint (6). The regulator maximizes expected total welfare, which is the dierence of gross
consumers' surplus and investment costs.
Without asymmetric information on costs, we saw in section 3 that the regulator can achieve the rst-
best investment levels (invest when prices reach threshold price p̄c), while respecting budget and participation
constraints. With private information on costs, the contracts oered will need to respect incentive compatibility
as well, and therefore will need to leave information rents to the rms. In view of the budget constraint, distorting
the contracts from the rst-best scheme is now optimal.
In analyzing the optimal scheme, we follow the standard procedure in optimal contract design, and focus
without loss of generality on direct revelation, incentive compatible mechanisms. The regulator oers a menu
of contracts to the rm, consisting of a transfer T (ĉ), and an investment threshold, Ā(Q, ĉ), that depend on the
rm's reported cost ĉ. The rm, by reporting costs ĉ, chooses the best option from this menu, which we design
such that truthful reporting, ĉ = c, is optimal.
We saw that both rst best and prot maximization require investing when prices reach threshold level, p̄c
and p̄m respectively, where those thresholds did not depend on capacity. Here, for expositional simplicity, we
assume likewise that the optimal threshold Ā(Q, ĉ) under adverse selection takes such a form, i.e. there will
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exist a threshold price p̄(ĉ) such that Ā(Q, ĉ)Q−γ = p̄(ĉ). In the appendix we demonstrate that this is indeed
optimal. We can then express the menu of contracts as a set of transfer fees and threshold prices, {(T (ĉ), p̄(ĉ))}.
At current demand level A, a contract specifying price threshold p̄(ĉ) will require a greeneld rm to
immediately invest capacityQ(p̄) to make current price equal the threshold price, Q = (Ap̄ )
1/γ , so that A = Ā(Q).
In addition the rm will have to increase capacity as demand A grows to ensure prices remain below the
threshold. Total rents R of accepting the contract (T (ĉ), p̄(ĉ)), for a rm with actual costs c, are then given by




= T (ĉ)− cQ(p̄(ĉ)) γλ
γλ− 1
. (16)
In the rst line, we used the expected present value of the costs of future expansions, computed analogously to
the cost component of the rm's continuation value V from (12). In the second line, we substituted Ā(Q) = p̄Qγ ,
to evaluate the integral.
Incentive compatibility now requires that the rm optimizes this value if it truthfully reveals its costs,
ĉ = c, choosing fee and threshold (T (c), p̄(c)) from the menu of contracts. Writing the resulting prots from this
optimization as Π(A, c) = R(A, c, ĉ = c), we derive the following necessary conditions for incentive compatibility.






and that the investment price threshold p̄(c) is non-decreasing in costs c.
We will analyze the welfare optimizing choice of contracts under incentive compatibility constraint (17), as
well as the budget and participation constraints, and ignore the monotonicity requirement on the threshold for
the moment. After nding an optimal threshold, we will verify that monotonicity indeed holds. As a rst step
let us write the welfare function and the budget constraint in terms of the threshold price p̄.
The regulator's objective is to maximize the total welfare, averaged over the possible realization of costs c.
For a given cost c and threshold price p̄, welfare includes the costs of a one-o lumpy investment Q to bring price
to the threshold at the current value of the demand shift A, the expected welfare generated by this investment
Q, as well as the expected additional welfare from future network expansions (i.e. real option value). From
equation (7),
W (p̄, c) = −cQ+ Ā(Q)Q
1−γ

























where again Q = (Ap̄ )
1/γ and we used p̄ = Ā(Q)Q−γ .
The budget constraint is that for any cost c, total prots, Π, cannot exceed total revenues minus costs.
Using the expression for continuation value of revenues and costs (equation 12) and again substituting p̄, we
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can write this as












































Summing up, we can now state the regulator's optimization program in terms of an optimal control problem,







(r − µ)λ(1− γ)
− c
]







with f(c) the density of the distribution of costs, co-state variable ν(c) the multiplier of the incentive constraint










At the upper boundary of the support of c, we impose that prots are zero, Π(cH) = 0. At the lower boundary,
we have either ν(cL) = 0, or price is at its monopoly level p̄
m(cL).
The solution to these rst-order equations is as follows
Proposition 1. Optimal threshold prices fall in one of three regimes:










• Regime II, the bunching regime: the budget constraint binds, p̄ is a constant in between competitive and












for some c0 within the interval in which this regime holds.
• Regime III, the monopoly regime: the budget constraint binds, price is at the monopoly level,







We see that as long as f(c) is non-increasing, prices are non-decreasing in each of the regimes. The optimal
strategy is then a combination of two of the above regimes, joined together such that threshold price p̄, co-state
variable ν and prot Π are continuous on the regime boundary:
Proposition 2. Optimal regulation involves either monopoly pricing (regime III) for the lowest cost types,
followed by the markup regime (Regime I) for higher types; or bunching at constant price (Regime II) for the
lowest types, followed by the markup regime (Regime I).
9
In the next section, we provide an illustration of the optimum strategy for the particular case of uniform
cost distribution f(c).
5 Example
For an illustration of the optimal regulation, we explore the case with uniform distribution on investment costs,
f(c) = 1cH−cL . In that case, we can do the required integrations analytically, and use that to solve the model.
As we will see, if the range of costs, measured by cH/cL, is not too large, we will have an optimum in which
lower-cost rms bunch at a constant price (Regime II), while for higher costs rms, the budget constraint will
not be binding and we are in the markup regime. Conversely, if cost uncertainty is large, the lowest cost types
will end up being unregulated and setting monopoly prices instead.
To nd the optimum we need to join together the various pricing regimes in a continuous fashion. We cannot
have only the markup regime with constant ν, since the boundary condition requires ν(cL) = 0, which would
imply marginal cost pricing, p̄ = p̄c everywhere and would violate incentive compatibility. It is also easy to
see that the only possibilities are to have either the monopoly regime at low costs, and the markup regime for
higher costs, or the bunching regime at low cost, with again the markup regime for higher costs.
Let us rst examine when the monopoly regime can be part of the solution, with monopoly prices for
costs cL ≤ c ≤ cm for some cm, and constant markup ν/f for c > cm. At cm, we have monopoly price
p̄(cm) = p̄




1−γ . For c > cm, ν remains constant at this level, and prices
retain their constant markup above the competitive level. To nd the appropriate transition point cm, we use
the facts that Π(cH) = 0, Π(cm) is at its monopoly value, and incentive compatibility (17) xes the slope of the
prot function dΠ/dc. Doing the integration leads to the following
Proposition 3. With uniform cost distribution and a large support cLcH ≤ ξ ≡ (1 − γ)(γ
γ
γ−1 − γ)−1, we have
monopoly pricing for c ∈ [cL, cm], and a constant markup on competitive prices for c ∈ [cm, cH ], with cm = cHξ.
If the range of costs is small, so that cL > cHξ, we do not have a monopoly regime but instead have bunching
at constant price for low cost levels, c < cb, while again we nd constant markups for c > cb. To nd cb, as well
as the price and markup levels, we can again use continuity of Π(c), p̄(c) and ν(c), and combine the incentive
compatibility equation (17) with the expression for ν in the bunching regime, (24). The resulting conditions on
the transition level cb and the bunching price are as in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. With uniform cost distribution and a small support cLcH ≥ ξ, we have bunching for c ∈ [cL, cb],
and the markup regime (with constant markup) for c ∈ [cb, cH ], with transition point cb and bunching price
p̄b ≡ (r−µ)λλ−1 p̃b determined jointly by the solution to
p̃b − cb =
p̃b(cb − cL)− 12 (c
2
b − c2L)
cb − p̃b(1− γ)
p̃
− 1γ












The rst equation in the proposition follows from integrating ν between cL and cb, and requiring that its
end value equals the markup in the markup regime. The second equation follows from making sure the prots
at that transition point (where the budget constraint holds with equality) coincide with the integral of the
incentive compatibility constraint, and prots at cH are zero.
We plot the results of the two solutions, one for high cost uncertainty (high cH/cL), gure 1, and one for
low cost uncertainty (cH/cL nearer to one), gure 2. In the rst case, we have monopoly pricing up to cm, and
in the second we see bunching at constant price for low realizations of costs.
With a direct revelation mechanism, the regulator oers the menu of contracts {(Π(c), p̄(c))} and the rm







Figure 1: Large information asymmetry:






Figure 2: Small information asymmetry: Bunch-








Figure 4: Taxes versus price threshold with bunch-
ing regime
the rm announces at which maximum threshold price level p̄ it will invest, and the regulator taxes a fraction
τ(p̄) of the revenue of selling capacity. Given an optimal menu of contracts {(Π(c), p̄(c))}, the tax rate τ(p̄) is
determined implicitly by the following condition:
Π(c) = [1− τ(p̄(c))]Revenue(p̄(c))− Costs(c, p̄(c)),
where Revenue(p̄) and Cost(c, p̄) are dened by equation (19). Such a τ(p̄) exists as p̄(c) is strictly increasing
in the mark-up regime and τ is zero in the two other regimes as the budget constraint binds and hence the rm















matching to τ = 0 at the transition point with the monopoly or bunching regimes. Figures 3 and 4 plot the
resulting set of pairs of threshold prices p̄ versus required taxes τ . With large cost asymmetry cH/cL, we have
the range of monopoly prices for low costs, accompanied with zero taxation. With smaller cH/cL, we have the
single bunching price for the lower cost realizations. To benet from the zero tax rate the rm needs to invest
early, at a relatively low threshold price. Alternatively, the rm could invest later, which implies accepting a
higher tax rate.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have derived the optimal regulation of network expansion, by combining the real option and
principal-agent literature. We show that a regulatory holiday might sometimes be optimal, not to prevent
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hold-up problems created by a lack of commitment power by the regulator as in Gans and King (2004), but
because of the combination of a self-nancing constraint and information asymmetry: The information rents of
ecient cost types need to be collected in the market, which require higher prices for network access and delayed
investments. However, such a regulatory holiday is not a blanket authorization for the rm to invest whenever it
feels t. It implies the requirement, in accordance with the relatively low expansion costs of the ecient rm, for
suciently early investment. If information asymmetries are small, the ecient rm requires less information
rents and a regulatory holiday is no longer optimal. Instead the regulator will bunch the regulatory contracts
for the most ecient rms, obliging them to invest at a price below the monopoly price.
Note that whether a regulatory holiday is socially optimal, does not depend on the level of demand uncer-
tainty, and the riskiness of investments.14 This stands in contrast with the requirement in EU energy markets,
that the risk should be too high for investments to incur without exemption. In our model, the regulatory
holiday is a reward for the low cost rm, who invests earlier than the high cost rm.
In the optimal regulation, inecient rms are subject to an investment requirement, i.e. they are obliged to
invest whenever the price for capacity reaches a threshold level. It is well known from the literature that when
demand is stochastic, a price cap cannot be used to both limit the rents of the regulated rm and to incentivize
timely investments. Instead the regulator needs to rely on a combination of instruments such as for instance in
the UK where the new regulation sets a price cap but also sets an output obligation on the rms. Alternatively,
as we show, the regulator can penalize a rm investing late by increasing its tax level.
Formally, our model considers greeneld investments. The same analysis holds, however, when regulated
rms are allowed by law to recoup sunk investments cost of previously built assets, as long as these are at or
below the regulated level. Such a principle of no regulatory takings is common. If, on the other hand, some
of the investments have already been fully paid o at the time of contracting, the participation contraint is
relaxed, and less information rents need to be paid to investors. The regulatory holiday regime is then less likely
to be optimal. We also assumed that capacity does not depreciate. This could easily be adjusted by appropriate
shifts in µ and r, as in Dobbs (2004).
In telecom markets, the upstream network access provider often competes with multiple access buyers in a
downstream market. In our paper we do not study the additional eects of providing access to downstream
competitors. In that case, regulatory price setting in the retail market should also take into account the
relaxation of the budget constraint in the network investment problem.
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A Proofs
Proof of lemma 1 The expressions for p̄m and p̄c (equations 13 and 14) are derived in the text. The zero
prot result for a greeneld rm (equation 15), follows from substituting A = p̄cQγ and Ā(q) = p̄cqγ in the
expression for rm value, equation (12), and integrating. We then nd








and by the denition of p̄c (14) this vanishes.
Proof of lemma 2 We have
R(c, ĉ) = T (ĉ)− cQ(p̄(ĉ)) γλ
γλ− 1
,











To verify that p̄(c) is non-decreasing in c, we note that truthful revelation for a rm with type c requires that
R(c, c)−R(c, ĉ) ≥ 0 for any ĉ. Equivalently, for a rm with type ĉ it must be that R(ĉ, ĉ)−R(ĉ, c) ≥ 0. Hence,
combining both expressions, for any c, ĉ, we must have that:














[Q(p̄(ĉ))−Q(p̄(c))] (c− ĉ) ≥ 0.
It then follows that for ĉ < c, Q(p̄(ĉ)) ≥ Q(p̄(c)), or as demand is downward sloping p̄(ĉ) ≤ p̄(c).




In cost-regions where the budget constraint (19) does not bind, its multiplier is zero, φ = 0, and hence ν is





we can write the rst-order condition of the Hamiltonian for p̄ (21) as:
f(c)(p̃− c)− ν + φ(p̃(1− γ)− c) = 0.




in this markup regime I.
In the cost-regions where the budget constraint (19) does bind, the rm's prot is equal to the revenue from












Given the incentive compatibility condition (17), the rst term on the right hand side is zero, we must then
have that either p̃ is constant, or ∂Π∂p̃ = 0, and hence monopoly pricing.
In the case of constant p̄, we are in the bunching regime II. From the rst order condition on p̄, with
dν/dc = φ, we then have
f(c)(p̃− c)− ν + dν
dc
(p̃(1− γ)− c) = 0,
with constant p̃. This is a dierential equation for ν(c), for which the solution is equation (24).
Finally, in the monopoly regime III, we have p̃m = c1−γ , so that the rst-order equation reduces to
ν(c)
f(c)
= p̃m − c = γc
γ − 1
. (26)
Proof of proposition 2 With f(c) non-increasing, ν(c)f(c) is non-decreasing in all three regimes. For the highest
cost realization cH , we have that the information rents are zero, Π(cH) = 0, and therefore a non-binding budget
regime (φ = 0), so we will have the markup regime. Suppose that for lower cost levels, we have a region [c, c̄] in
which the bunching regime at a constant price p̂ applies, cH > c̄ > c > cL. As the lower boundary is assumed to
be strictly larger than cL, the bunching regime is connected from below to one of the other regimes (monopoly or
markup regime). Hence, at his point c = c̄, we have p̂−c = ν(c)f(c) , since that relation holds in both monopoly and
markup regimes. Similarly, the bunching regime is connected to the monopoly or markup regime from above,
so we must have p̂ − c̄ = ν(c̄)f(c̄) . But this leads to a contradiction since c̄ > c and ν(c)/f(c) is non-decreasing.
Hence we cannot have c > cL, and hence if the bunching regime occurs it is optimal for certain cost level, it is
also the case for all lower cost levels.
Proof of proposition 3 Consider a monopoly regime in the region [cL, cm]. At the boundary cm, we need
to match price p̄(cm), co-state variable ν(cm) and prot Π(cm) to a constant markup regime on [cm, cH ] on
which ν = νcte is a constant, and where prot Π(c) is determined by the boundary condition Π(cH) = 0 and







which determines νcte as a function of cm. The price in the mark-up regime is then determined by p̃ = c+
νcte
f ,







With, by continuity of prots, Π(cm) also equaling the monopoly prot at that point, we can then work out
the required value of cm.
Proof of proposition 4 In the alternative case of the bunching regime for low cost c ∈ [cL, cb] and the markup
regime for higher costs c ∈ [cb, cH ], we again nd the boundary point cb by matching price p̄, co-stage variable ν
and prot Π. The co-state variable ν is dened in bunching region by a dierential equation and the boundary
condition ν(cL) = 0. Prot in the mark-up regime is dened by the incentive compatibility and the boundary
condition Π(cH) = 0.
We rst compute ν(cb) from the dierential equation for ν in the bunching region, with boundary condition
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p̃b(cb − cL) + 12 (c
2
L − c2b)
cb − p̃b(1− γ)
and this should equal p̃b − cb = ν
cte
f by matching to the markup region. This is the rst equation of the
proposition.







where p̃(c) = c+ ν
cte
f = c+ p̃b − cb. Matching this to the prots at cb from the binding budget constraint gives
the second equation of the proposition.
B Constant price thresholds
In this appendix we establish that also in the adverse selection case, the investment threshold occurs at constant
price, p̄ = Ā(Q)Q−γ . In terms of Ā(Q), we have welfare
W (Ā(Q), c) = −cQ+ AQ
1−γ































Combining these, we can then write the Hamiltonian
H = AQ
1−γ
(1− γ)(r − µ)








(f + (1− γ)φ)− (fc+ ν + φc)
)
dq
− (fc+ ν + φc)Q− φ(c)Π.
To optimize, we now need to use variational calculus on the function Ā(Q). Such a variation also induces a
concomitant variation δQ so as to keep Ā(Q) = A veried. It is now straightforward to see that the δQ terms









(f + (1− γ)φ) + λ(fc+ ν + φc)
]
dq = 0
Since this holds for any variation δĀ(Q), we see that Ā(Q)Q−γ is independent from Q, and we regain the
rst-order equations from the main text.
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